Archive for the ‘Sports & Game Theory’ Category

Baseball geekery: how fast should a fastball be?

Friday, February 19th, 2010

Here at DraftMVP World HQ (ok, ok, it’s just us on our laptops at a coffee shop), we like to throw around lots of crazy ideas about data, sports and how to beat each other at fantasy sports. Shocking, right?

In any case, we couldn’t help but pass along this awesome piece from the Hardball Times that analyzes how fast a fastball should be:

http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/how-fast-should-a-fastball-be/

As a preview, check out one of the excellent charts the post includes, highlighting pitch speed effectiveness (measured in Runs per 100 pitches) by section of the strike zone. Awesome awesome stuff.

Effectiveness of various speeds of pitches, by strike zone

Fantasy Strategies: Think Different

Friday, February 19th, 2010

In our quest to provide you with Fantasy Sports tools that enable you to make different decisions for your team, we’re always reading interesting takes on sports statistics. One of our favorite writers here is a guy named Joe Posnanski, who wrote a great piece towards the end of the 2009 baseball season. You can check it out here, but our favorite excerpt comes about halfway through:

I mentioned Bill James again … you know that he said he could throw 10 wildly unconventional ideas at me right off the top of his head, but he only actually mentioned one: The off-the-wall idea that maybe some team (say the Pittsburgh Pirates) simply decides that they will stop scouting and acquiring anyone who throws 90-plus mph. Just stop. You throw 95? Good for you, we’re not interested.

I will repeat: Bill wasn’t saying a team should actually do this. He was saying that a team COULD do this, though. I mean, seriously, what would happen? Let’s run a little thought experiment: You’re running the Pirates. And let’s say this was true:

50% of all potential big league pitchers who throw 95 mph will be good big league pitchers.

2% of all potential big league pitchers who throw 83 mph will be good big league pitchers.

I’m sure those percentages are way skewed — no way that half the 95-mph throwers are good big league pitchers, and I have no way of knowing about the 2%. But you can fill in any number you want … the point is we say there are 100 potential pitchers who throw 95, and in this scenario 50 of them will be good pitchers. OK, well, you’re the Pittsburgh Pirates. How many of those 50 do you think you’re going to get? You are competing against 29 other teams that also want guys who can light up the radar gun. The vast majority of those 29 teams have more resources than you do, more scouts poking and prodding those prospects, more money to sign them, more clout to draw them in, more status among players and their families and their agents.

So — my guess? You’re not getting any of those 50. Zero. Oh, you might get some of the 95-mph throwers who WILL NOT be good big league pitchers. And, sure, there’s a chance you could luck into one. But it would take luck. Best bet: A big fat zero.

No, look at the other side. There is much larger pool of pitchers to pick from who top out at 83 mph, or 81 or whatever. Say there are 500 of those. By this formula, 2 percent of them could pitch effectively in the big leagues — that would be 10 pitchers (maybe you don’t believe ANY of them will be good … we’ll get to that in a second). Now, you’re the Pittsburgh Pirates — what are the chances you would get any of those 10?

Well, again, I’m guessing here: But my feeling is that if you have decided to just stop looking at the 95 mph guys and focused ALL YOUR ENERGIES on these slow-throwing guys, well, I think the chances are pretty good that you would get some, most or even all of those 10 pitchers. Why? Because, generally speaking, other teams are not investing much effort in scouting people who top out at 83. They are not scouting those players, they are not making much effort sign those players, they’re not spending draft picks on those players. They simply do not VALUE those players. if you focus all of your effort on it — and you believe in what you’re doing — you will probably figure out which of those slow-throwers has the command, quirkiness, control or movement necessary to get big leaguers out. And if you choose to value command and quirkiness and control and utterly devalue the radar gun, you should be able to corner that market.

Now, there would be people who would say this is a pointless market to corner — that 83 mph pitchers is a dry well. Maybe that’s true. But MAYBE it’s not true. Maybe you can find a cool study that suggests an 83-mph fastball down and away is just as effective a pitch as an 94-mph fastball down and away. Maybe you can point to a collection of ineffective pitchers who can throw really hard (Exhibit A: The Kansas City Royals bullpen) and conclude that speed isn’t all that compelling when it comes to getting out big league hitters. Maybe you would do the math and find that the best slow-throwers would make a better staff than one filled with bottom-third hard-throwers.

Maybe. Look, this is only one idea, and nobody (and especially not Bill) is saying it’s a great idea. But what the heck, it COULD work. And if over the last decade you are the Pirates, the Royals, the Nationals, the Reds, the Orioles … what has worked for you?

What’s important about this is the idea that teams could adopt different strategies in order to change their future, but they often don’t. The same logic applies to fantasy baseball: in thinking about your draft strategies this year, it’s worthwhile to take the time to evaluate what your “normal” strategy is and to identify ways in which you can change it. Of course, we’ve got some ideas for you – our Draft Tool is the perfect way to kick your ass into a new way of thinking about your draft! Try it out for free here

Guest Post: Steroids, A-Rod & Game Theory

Wednesday, April 1st, 2009

From time to time, DraftMVP’s blog features guests who have done some interesting and valuable thinking about sports, analysis and decision-making. We’re proud to share with you excellent writing on the Steroids situation (which we talked about here) , A-Rod (who we talked about here) and Game Theory (which we clearly need to write about). This comes to you from Guest Blogger and friend of DraftMVP: Apurva Desai.

Apurva blogs about sports, life and his own musings at http://apurvadesai.com/ and you can reach him via e-mail at apurva.desai@yahoo.com

The recent revelation that baseball superstar Alex Rodriguez tested positive for steroids in 2003 has rocked the sports world and reignited the seemingly never ending steroid saga. But really, should anyone be surprised.

The late Ken Caminiti admitted in a Sports Illustrated story that he had used steroids during his 1996 MVP season and had indicated he doesn’t regret using them to get ahead. He further said, “It’s no secret what’s going on in baseball. At least half the guys are using [steroids],” says Caminiti. “They talk about it. They joke about it with each other. … I don’t want to hurt fellow teammates or fellow friends. But I’ve got nothing to hide.”

Later, Jose Canseco, in front of Congress and in his book “Juiced- Wild Times, Rampant ‘Roids, Smash Hits, and How Baseball got Big”, claimed that 80 percent of players used steroids and that MLB owners condoned steroid use because they felt a deluge of home runs would help win back the fans after the strike wiped out the 1994 World Series. While Canseco is clearly not the smartest bulb in the box, much of what he says has proven to be true.

I personally believe that the 50% to 80% figure is much more accurate than the 7% that MLB reported after their 2003 testing. The reason why the 50%+ clearly makes sense to me is all about game theory.

The classic game theory prisoners dilemma example is presented as follows (as shown in Wikipedia): Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same deal. If one testifies (defects) for the prosecution against the other and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence. Each prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent. Each one is assured that the other would not know about the betrayal before the end of the investigation. How should the prisoners act? The classical prisoner’s dilemma can be summarized thus:

Prisoner B Stays Silent Prisoner B Betrays
Prisoner A Stays Silent Each serves 6 months Prisoner A: 10 years

Prisoner B: goes free

Prisoner A Betrays Prisoner A: goes free

Prisoner B: 10 years

Each serves 5 years

In this game, regardless of what the opponent chooses, each player always receives a higher payoff (lesser sentence) by betraying; that is to say that betraying is the strictly dominant strategy. For instance, Prisoner A can accurately say, “No matter what Prisoner B does, I personally am better off betraying than staying silent. Therefore, for my own sake, I should betray.” However, if the other player acts similarly, then they both betray and both get a lower payoff than they would get by staying silent. Rational self-interested decisions result in each prisoner’s being worse off than if each chose to lessen the sentence of the accomplice at the cost of staying a little longer in jail himself (hence the seeming dilemma).

Now, if I apply the game theory matrix to two competing professional baseball players who have two choices- 1) take steroids vs 2) not taking steroids. Let’s assume this is during the early 2000’s when there wasn’t a steroid testing program, steroids were readily available for all of the players if they wanted it, and the players lifetime livelihood depends on their income from baseball (which is the case for the majority of players who don’t have college educations nor many other skills). The major downside is long-term health issues as the likelihood of suspension and arrest weren’t high due to the absence of the testing program.

Player B Doesn’t Take Steroids

Player B Takes Steroids

Player A Doesn’t Take Steroids

Player A

  • Competitive Balance-for both players- success ($ and onfield) and MLB longevity depends on natural talent
  • No Long Term Health Impact

Player B

  • Competitive Balance-for both players- success ($ and onfield) and MLB longevity depends on natural talent
  • No Long Term Health Impact
Player A

  • Competitive Disadvantage (greater likelihood of having roster spot taken by steroid enhanced player, lesser performance vs peers, consequently less $)
  • No Long Term Health Impact

Player B

  • Competitive Advantage (helps ensure career longevity, better on-field performance and more $)
  • Negative Long Term Health Impact

Player A Takes Steroids

Player A

  • Competitive Advantage (helps ensure career longevity, better on-field performance and more $)
  • Negative Long Term Health Impact

Player B

  • Competitive Disadvantage (greater likelihood of having roster spot taken by steroid enhanced player, lesser performance vs peers, consequently less $)
  • No Long Term Health Impact
Player A

  • Competitive Balance-for both players- success ($ and onfield) and MLB longevity depends on natural talent (steroid impact offset-benefits all)
  • Negative Long Term Health Impact

Player B

  • Competitive Balance-for both players- success ($ and onfield) and MLB longevity depends on natural talent (steroid impact offset-benefits all)
  • Negative Long Term Health Impact

In this game, for each player in terms of on-field performance and monetary reward, the best result he can get when not taking steroids is to be at a competitive balance with his peers which is the worst result the player would get when taking steroids. Furthermore, the risk if he did not take steroids when his peers did was to have a competitive disadvantage which could cost him his spot in the major leagues, reduce their salary potential or worse, limit their earning potential to minor league salaries. Now of course, as the matrix indicates, taking steroids is linked to long-term health impacts. The bottom line though for the majority of these players is that the chance to ensure their major league salary would clearly offset the risk to his long-term health—the payoff of having a competitive balance or advantage would be greater than avoiding unknown long term health risks. Given that the majority of baseball players are not superstars who are on the fringe of staying in the major leagues vs being in the minor leagues or out of the game, during that period without real testing and penalties for taking steroids, it is easily understandable why more than 50% of players would be taking steroids.

The harder question is why players such as Barry Bonds and Alex Rodriguez would begin to take steroids after they had already become superstars without the benefit of steroids (allegedly— don’t know for certain). These players place in the league was already guaranteed, their contracts were already amongst the highest in the league, and their performance already granted them All-star status. These players really didn’t have as much incentive to take steroids and risk their health as the common average player. However, greed, personal ambition to be the best in the game in this era or any era, and to live up to large contracts they had already earned may be reason for top players to have taken steroids in an era when there weren’t penalties for steroids.